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Abstract
We present a method for creating inconspicuous-looking
textures that, when displayed as posters in the physical
world, cause visual object tracking systems to become con-
fused. As a target being visually tracked moves in front
of such a poster, its adversarial texture makes the tracker
lock onto it, thus allowing the target to evade. This adver-
sarial attack evaluates several optimization strategies for
fooling seldom-targeted regression models: non-targeted,
targeted, and a newly-coined family of guided adversarial
losses. Also, while we use the Expectation Over Transfor-
mation (EOT) algorithm to generate physical adversaries
that fool tracking models when imaged under diverse con-
ditions, we compare the impacts of different scene variables
to find practical attack setups with high resulting adversar-
ial strength and convergence speed. We further showcase
that textures optimized using simulated scenes can confuse
real-world tracking systems for cameras and robots.
1. Introduction
Research on adversarial attacks [24, 9, 18] have shown
that deep learning models, e.g., for classification and detec-
tion tasks, are confused by adversarial examples: slightly-
perturbed images of objects that cause them to make wrong
predictions. While early attacks digitally modified inputs
to a victim model, later advances created photos [14] and
objects in the physical world that lead to misclassification
under diverse imaging conditions [7, 1]. Due to these added
complexities, many physical adversaries were not created
to look indistinguishable from regular items, but rather as
inconspicuous objects such as colorful eyeglasses [20, 21].
We study the creation of physical adversaries for an ob-
ject tracking task, of which the goal is to find the bounding-
box location of a target in the current camera frame given
its location in the previous frame. We present a method for
generating Physical Adversarial Textures (PAT) that, when
displayed as advertisement or art posters, cause regression-
based neural tracking models like GOTURN [10] to break
away from their tracked targets, even though these textures
(a) source texture (b) adversarial texture
Figure 1: A poster of a Physical Adversarial Texture resem-
bling a photograph, causes a tracker’s bounding-box predic-
tions to lose track as the target person moves over it.
do not look like targets to human eyes, as seen in Figure 1.
Fooling a tracking system comes with added challenges
compared to attacking classification or detection models.
Since a tracker adapts to changes in the target’s appear-
ance, an adversary must be universally effective as the target
moves and turns. Also, some trackers like GOTURN only
search within a sub-region of the frame around the previ-
ous target location, and so only a small part of the PAT may
be in view and not obstructed, yet it must still be potent.
Furthermore, it is insufficient for the tracker to be slightly
off-target on any single frame, as it may still end up track-
ing the target semi-faithfully; robust adversaries must cause
the system to break away from the tracked target over time.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. first known demo of adversaries for sequential tracking
tasks, impacting domains such as surveillance, drone
photography, and autonomous convoying,
2. coining of “guided adversarial losses” concept, which
strikes a middle-ground between targeted and non-
targeted adversarial objectives, and empirically shown
to enhance convergence and adversarial strength,
3. study of Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) [1],
highlighting the need to randomize only certain scene
variables while still creating potent adversaries, and
4. show sim-to-real transfer of PATs created using a non-
photorealistic simulator and diffuse-only materials.
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2. Related Work
Early white-box physical adversarial attacks, which as-
sumed access to the victim model’s internals, created print-
able adversaries that were effective under somewhat vary-
ing views [14], by using gradient-based methods such as
FGSM [9]. Similar approaches were employed to create
eyeglass frames for fooling face recognition models [20,
21], and to make stop signs look like speed limits to a road
sign classifier [7]. Both latter systems only updated gradi-
ents within a masked region in the image, namely over the
eyeglass frame or road sign. Still, neither work explicitly
accounted for the effects of lighting on the imaged items.
Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) [1] formalized
the strategy used by [20, 7] of optimizing for adversarial
attributes of a mask, by applying a combination of random
transformations to it. By varying the appearance and po-
sition of a 2-D photograph or 3-D textured object as the
mask, EOT-based attacks [1, 3, 15] generated physically-
realizable adversaries that are robust within a range of
viewing conditions. Our attack also applies EOT, but we
importantly study the efficacy and the need to random-
ize over different transformation variables, including fore-
ground/background appearances, lighting, spatial locations
of the camera, target, adversary, and surrounding objects.
CAMOU is a black-box attack that also applied EOT
to create adversarial textures for a car that made it non-
detectable by object detection networks. CAMOU approxi-
mated the gradient of an adversarial objective through both
the complex rendering process and opaque victim network,
by using a learned surrogate mapping [17] from the texture
space directly onto the detector’s confidence score. Both
their attack and evaluations were carried out using a photo-
realistic rendering engine. Still, this method was not tested
in the real world, and also incurs high computational costs
and potential instability risks due to the alternation optimiz-
ing the surrogate model and the adversarial perturbations.
DeepBillboard [27] attacked autonomous driving sys-
tems by creating adversarial billboards that caused a victim
model to deviate its predicted steering angles within real-
world drive-by sequences. While our work shares many
commonalities with DeepBillboard, we confront added
challenges by attacking a sequential tracking model rather
than a per-frame regression network, and we also contrast
the effectiveness of differing adversarial objectives.
3. Object Tracking Networks
Various learning-based tracking methods have been pro-
posed, such as the recent GOTURN [10] deep neural net-
work that regresses the location of an object in a cam-
era frame given its previous location and appearance.
While other tracking methods based on feature-space cross-
correlation [2, 25] and tracking-by-detection [8] are also vi-
able, we focus on GOTURN models to ground our studies
on the effectiveness of different types of adversarial losses,
as well as the compute efficiency of an EOT-based attack.
As seen in Figure 2, given a target’s bounding-box loca-
tion lˆj−1 of size w × h in the previous frame fj−1, GO-
TURN crops out the template f˜j−1 as a region of size
2w×2h around the target within fj−1. The current frame fj
is also cropped to the same region, yielding the search area
f˜j , which is assumed to contain most of the target still. Both
the template and search area are resized to 227 × 227 and
processed through convolutional layers. The resulting fea-
ture maps are then concatenated and passed through fully-
connected layers with non-linear activations, ultimately re-
gressing lj = {(xmin, ymin), (xmax, ymax)} ∈ [0, 1]4, that
is, the top-left and bottom-right coordinates of the target’s
location within the current search area f˜j .
Such predictions can also be used for visual servoing,
i.e., to control an aerial or wheeled robot to follow a tar-
get through space. One approach [11, 22] is to regulate the
center-points and areas of predictions about the center of
the camera frame and the desired target size, respectively,
using Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controllers on
the forward/backward, lateral, and possibly vertical veloci-
ties of the vehicle. In this work, we show that visual track-
ing models, as well as derived visual servoing controllers
for aerial robots, can be compromised by PATs.
4. Attacking Regression Networks
For classification tasks, an adversarial example is de-
fined as a slightly-perturbed version of a source image that
satisfies two conditions: adversarial output — the victim
model misclassifies the correct label, and perceptual simi-
larity — the adversary is perceived by humans as similar
to the source image. We discuss necessary adjustments to
both conditions when attacking regression tasks. While re-
cent work has shown the existence of adversaries that con-
fuse regression tasks [6, 27], there is still a general lack of
analysis on the strength and properties of adversaries as a
function of different attack objectives. In this work, we con-
sider various ways to optimize for an adversary, and notably
formalize a new family of guided adversarial losses. While
this work focuses on images, the concepts discussed below
are generally applicable to other domains as well, such as
fooling audio transcriptions [6].
4.1. Adversarial Strength
There is no task-agnostic analog to misclassification for
regression models, due to the non-discrete representation
of their outputs. Typically, a regression output is charac-
terized as adversarial by thresholding a task-specific error
metric. This metric may also be used to quantify adver-
sarial strength. For instance, adversaries for human pose-
prediction can be quantified by the percentage of predicted
joint poses beyond a certain distance from ground-truth lo-
cations [6]. As another example, DeepBillboard [27] de-
fines unsafe driving for an autonomous vehicle as experi-
encing an excessive amount of total lateral deviation, and
quantifies adversarial strength as the percentage of frames
in a given unit of time where the steering angle error ex-
ceeds a corresponding threshold.
When fooling a visual tracker, the end-goal is for the sys-
tem to break away from the target over time. Therefore, we
consider a sequence of frames F † = {f†1 , f†2 , ..., f†N}where
the target moves across a poster containing an adversarial
texture χ, and quantify adversarial strength by the average
amount of overlap between tracker predictions lj (computed
from f†j−1, f
†
j ) and the target’s actual locations lˆj . We also
separate the tracker’s baseline performance from the effects
of the adversary, by computing the average overlap ratio
across another sequence F = {f1, f2, ..., fN}, in which the
adversarial texture is replaced by an inert source texture.
Thus, in this work, adversarial strength is defined by aver-
aging the mean-Intersection-Over-Union-difference met-
ric, µIOUd, over multiple generated sequences:
IOU(lj , lˆj) =
A(lj ∩ lˆj)
A(lj) +A(lˆj)−A(lj ∩ lˆj)
µIOUd =
1
N − 1
∑
j∈[2,N ],fj∈F
IOU
(
lj(fj−1, fj), lˆj
)
(1)
− 1
N − 1
∑
j∈[2,N ],f†j ∈F†
IOU
(
lj(f
†
j−1, f
†
j ), lˆj
)
where∩ denotes the intersection of two bounding boxes and
A(·) denotes the area of the bounding box l.
4.2. Perceptual Similarity
Perceptual similarity is often measured by the distance
between a source image and its perturbed variant, e.g., using
Euclidean norm in the RGB colorspace [24, 4]. Sometimes,
we apply a loose threshold to this constraint, to generate
universal adversaries that remain potent under diverse con-
ditions [16, 1, 26]. Other times, the goal is not to imitate
a source image, but merely to create an inconspicuous tex-
ture that does not look harmful to humans, yet cause models
to misbehave [20, 3, 27]. With this work, we aim to raise
public awareness that colorful-looking art can be harmful
to vision models.
4.3. Optimizing for Adversarial Behaviors
While our attack’s end-goal is to cause the tracker to
break away from its target, we can encourage different ad-
versarial behaviors, such as locking onto part of an ad-
versarial poster or focusing onto other parts of the scene.
These behaviors are commonly optimized into an adver-
sary through loss minimization, e.g., using gradient descent.
The literature has proposed several families of adversarial
losses, notably:
• the baseline non-targeted loss Lnt maximizes the vic-
tim model’s training loss, thus causing it to become
generally confused (e.g., FGSM [9], BIM [14]);
• targeted losses Lt also apply the victim model’s train-
ing loss, but to minimize the distance to an adversarial
target output (e.g., JSMA [18]);
• we define guided losses Lg as middle-grounds be-
tween Lnt and Lt, which regulate specific adversarial
attributes rather than strict output values, analogous to
misclassification onto a set of output values [14]; and
• hybrid losses use a weighted linear combination of the
above losses to gain adversarial strength and speed up
the attack (e.g., C&W [4], Hot/Cold [19] attacks).
The motivation for guided losses stems from our obser-
vations of the optimization rigidity of targeted losses, and
weak guidance from the non-targeted loss. Although simi-
lar ideas have been used [4, 27], we formally coin “guided
adversarial objectives” as those that regulate attributes of
the victim model’s output about specific adversarial values.
To fool object trackers, we consider these specific losses:
• Lnt = −||l†j−lˆj ||1 increases GOTURN’s training loss;
• Lt− = ||l†j − {(0.0, 0.9), (0.1, 1.0)}||1 shrinks predic-
tions towards the bottom-left corner of the search area;
• Lt= = ||l†j − {(0.25, 0.25), (0.75, 0.75)}||1 predicts
the exact location of the target in the previous frame;
• Lt+ = ||l†j − {(0.0, 0.0), (1.0, 1.0)}||1 grows predic-
tions to the maximum size of the search area;
• Lga− = min(A(l†j)−A(lˆj), 0) encourages the area of
each prediction to shrink from the ground-truth value;
• Lga+ = max(A(l†j) − A(lˆj), 0): encourages the area
of each prediction to grow from the ground-truth value.
Note that other guided losses are also possible, such as
maximizing or minimizing the magnitudes of predictions.
For succinctness, we evaluated against a non-targeted loss
and the simplest of targeted losses as baselines, to show that
a well-engineered guided loss has the potential for better
convergence and adversarial strength.
Additionally, we can enforce perceptual similarity by
adding a Lagrangian-relaxed loss Lps [24, 4, 1]. Its asso-
ciated weight can be set heuristically, or fine-tuned via line
search into the smallest value resulting in sufficient adver-
sarial strength. While most of our experiments generate in-
conspicuous adversaries that do not enforce perceptual sim-
ilarity, Section 6.4 specifically showcases imitation attacks.
In summary, our attack method optimizes a (possibly-
imitated) source texture χ0 into an adversarial variant χi
over i ∈ [1, Imax] iterations, by minimizing a weighted lin-
ear combination of loss terms:
L = w¯ · [Lnt,Lt...,Lg...,Lps]T (2)
where the texture is incrementally updated as:
χi = χi−1 + αi ·∆χ (3)
Here, αi denotes the step size at the i-th iteration, and ∆χ
denotes a perturbation term based on the gradient∇χL.
5. Physical Adversarial Textures
We now discuss how the above attack formulation can be
generalized to produce Physical Adversarial Textures (PAT)
that resemble colorful art. Such PATs, when displayed on a
digital poster and captured by camera frames near a tracked
target, causes a victim model to lose track of the target.
In this work, we assume to have white-box access to the
GOTURN network’s weights and thus the ability to back-
propagate through it. We focus on tracking people and hu-
manoid robots in particular and assume that the tracker was
trained on such types of targets.
As mentioned in Section 1, several challenges arise when
creating adversaries to fool temporal tracking models. We
address these by applying the Expectation Over Transfor-
mation (EOT) algorithm [1], which minimizes the expected
loss E [L] over a minibatch of B scenes imaged under di-
verse conditions. EOT marginalizes across the distributions
of different transformation variables, such as the poses of
the camera, tracked target, and poster, as well as the appear-
ances of the target, environmental surroundings, and ambi-
ent lighting. However, marginalizing over wide ranges of
condition variables can be very computationally expensive.
Thus, Section 6.3 studies the effects on adversarial strength
and attack speeds resulting from varying EOT variables.
An essential addition when generating a physical adver-
sarial item, as opposed to a digital one, is the need to render
the textured item into scenes as it evolves during the attack
process. Our attack creates PATs purely from scenes ren-
dered using the Gazebo simulator [13], yet Section 6.5 will
show that these adversaries are also potent in the real world.
5.1. Modeling rendering and lighting
To optimize the loss with respect to the texture of a phys-
ical poster, we need to differentiate through the rendering
process. Rendering can be simplified into two steps: pro-
jecting the texture onto the surface of a physical item and
then onto the camera’s frame, and shading the color of each
frame pixel depending on light sources and material types.
Similar to [15], we sidestep shading complexities, such
as spotlight gradients and specular surfaces, by assuming
controlled imaging conditions: the PAT is displayed on a
matte material and is lit by a far-away sun-like source, and
the camera’s exposure is adjusted not to cause pixel satu-
ration. Consequently, we employ a linear lighting model,
where each pixel’s RGB intensities in the camera frame is a
scaled and shifted version of pixel values for the projected
texture coordinate. During our attack, we query the Gazebo
simulation software to obtain exact gains for light intensity
and material reflectance, while before each real-world test
we fit parameters of this per-channel linear lighting model
once, using a displayed color calibration target.
As for the projection component, we modified Gazebo’s
renderer to provide projected frame coordinates for each
texture pixel (similar to [1]), as well as occlusion masks and
bounding boxes of the target in the foreground. We then use
this texture-to-frame mapping to manually back-propagate
through the projection process onto the texture space.
5.2. PAT Attack
Figure 2 shows the overall procedure for generating a
Physical Adversarial Texture. Starting from a source texture
χ0, we perform minibatch gradient descent onL to optimize
pixel perturbations that adds onto the texture, for a total of
Imax iterations. On each iteration i, we apply EOT to a
minibatch of B scenes, each with randomized settings for
the poses of the camera, target, and poster, the identities
of the target and background, and the hue-saturation-value
settings of a single directional light source.
Each scene entails two frames {fj−1, fj}, in which both
the camera and tracked target may have moved between the
previous and current frames. Given the target’s previous
actual location lˆj−1, we crop both frames around a cor-
respondingly scaled region, then resize and process them
through the GOTURN network, to predict the bounding-
box location lj of the target in the current frame. We then
back-propagate from the combined loss objective L onto
the texture space through all partial-derivative paths. After
repeating the above process for all B scenes, we compute
the expected texture gradient, and update the texture using
the Fast Gradient Sign optimizer [9], scaled by the current
iteration’s step size αi:
∆χ = −sign(∇χE [L]) (4)
6. Experiments
In this section, we present an empirical comparison
of PAT attacks using non-targeted, targeted, guided, and
hybrid losses. We also assess which EOT conditioning
variables are most useful for producing strong adversaries
quickly. Furthermore, we analyze PATs resulting from im-
itation attacks and their induced adversarial behaviors. Fi-
nally, we showcase the transfer of PATs generated in simu-
lation for fooling tracking system in a real-world setup.
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Figure 2: The Physical Adversarial Texture (PAT) Attack creates adversaries to fool the GOTURN tracker, via minibatch
gradient descent to optimize various losses, using randomized scenes following Expectation Over Transformation (EOT).
6.1. Setup
All PAT attacks were carried out using simulated scenes
rendered by Gazebo. This conveniently provides an endless
stream of independently-sampled scenes, with controlled
poses and appearances for the target, textured poster, cam-
era, background, and lighting. We created multiple scenar-
ios, including 3 outdoor views of a 2.6m×2m poster in front
of a building, forest, or playground, and an indoor coffee
shop scene where a half-sized poster is hung on the wall.
We also varied tracked targets among models of 3 different
persons and 2 humanoid robots.
6.1.1 Trained GOTURN models
We trained several GOTURN networks on various combina-
tions of synthetic and real-world labeled datasets for track-
ing people and humanoid robots. The synthetic dataset con-
tains over 1, 400 short tracking sequences with more than
300, 000 total frames, while the real-world dataset consists
of 29 videos with over 50, 000 frames of one of two per-
sons, moving around an office garage and at a park. We
used the Adam optimizer [12] with an initial learning rate
of 10−5 and a batch size of 32. Models trained on synthetic-
only data (sim) lasted 300, 000 iterations with the learning
rate halved every 30, 000 iterations, while those trained on
combined datasets (s+r) or on the real-world dataset after
bootstrapping from the synthetic-trained model (s2r) ran
for 150, 000 iterations with the learning rate halved every
15, 000 iterations. In addition to the architecture of [10]
(Lg), we also trained smaller-capacity models with more
aggressive striding instead of pooling layers and fewer units
in the fully-connected layers (Sm). While this section eval-
uates a subset of model instances, our Appendices present
comprehensive results on other networks.
6.1.2 Evaluation Metric
As discussed in Section 4.1, we evaluate each PAT by gen-
erating sequences in which a tracked target moves from one
side of the textured poster to the other. Each sequence ran-
domly draws from manually-chosen ranges for the target,
camera, and poster poses, hue-saturation-value settings for
the light source, target identities, and background scenes.
We run the GOTURN tracker on each sequence twice, dif-
fered by the display of either the PAT or an inert source tex-
ture on the poster. Adversarial strength is then computed as
the average µIOUd metric over 20 random sequence pairs.
Anecdotally, for average µIOUd values around 0.2, the
tracker’s predictions expanded and worsened as the target
moved over the poster, yet GOTURN locked back onto the
target as it moved away. In contrast, values greater than
0.4 reflected cases where GOTURN consistently lost track
of the target during and at the end of the sequence, thus
showing notably worse tracking compared to an inert poster.
6.1.3 Baseline Attack Settings
We carried out hyperparameter search to determine a set
of attack parameters that produce strong adversaries (see
Appendix D). Unless otherwise stated, each PAT attack ran
on the regular-capacity synthetic-trained GOTURN model
(Lg,sim), with: Imax = 1, 000 attack iterations, EOT
minibatch with B = 20 samples, FGS optimizer with
step sizes of αi≤500 = 0.75 and then αi>500 = 0.25,
and starting from a randomly-initialized source texture with
128×128 pixels. All presented results are averaged over 10
attack instances, with different initial random seeds.
6.2. Efficacy of Adversarial Losses for Regression
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(a) Different adversarial losses
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(b) Individual vs hybrid adversarial losses
Figure 3: PAT attack strength for various adversarial losses.
Figure 3a depicts the progression in adversarial strength
throughout PAT attack runs for the different adversarial
losses proposed in Section 4.3. Comparing against the
non-targeted baseline EOT attack (Lnt) , most targeted and
guided losses resulted in slower convergence and worse fi-
nal adversarial strength. This is not surprising as these
adversarial objectives apply stricter constraints on the de-
sired adversarial behaviors and thus need to be optimized
for longer. As the sole exception, the guided loss encour-
aging smaller-area predictions (Lga−) attained the fastest
convergence and best adversarial strength overall. This
suggests that well-engineered adversarial objectives, espe-
cially loosely-guided ones, benefit by speeding up and im-
proving the attack process on regression tasks.
In Figure 3b, we see that combining Lnt with most tar-
geted or guided losses did not significantly change perfor-
mance. While not shown, we saw similar results when us-
ing 1:1000 weight ratios. However, the 1:1 combination of
Lnt & Lt= attained better overall performance than both
Lnt and Lt=. This suggests that sometimes adding a non-
targeted loss to a targeted or guided one helps, possibly due
to the widening of conditions for adversarial behaviors.
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Figure 4: PATs generated using different adversarial losses.
As seen in Figure 4, various patterns emerge in PATs
generated by different losses. We note that dark “striped
patches” always appeared in PATs generated from certain
losses, and these patches caused GOTURN to lock on and
break away from the tracked target. On the other hand,
“striped patches” did not show up for PATs created using
Lga+ or Lt+ , which showed uniform patterns. This is ex-
pected as these losses encourage the tracker’s predictions to
grow in size, rather than fixating onto a specific location.
6.3. Ablation of EOT Conditioning Variables
Here, we assess which variables for controlling the ran-
dom sampling of scenes had strong effects, and which ones
could be set to fixed values without impact, thus reducing
scene randomization and speeding up EOT-based attacks.
As seen in Figure 5a, reducing variety in appearances of
the background (-bg), target (-target), and light vari-
ations (-light), did not substantially affect adversarial
strength when other parameter ranges were held constant.
Also, increasing diversity in +target and +bg did not re-
sult in different end-performance. This suggests that diver-
sity in target and background appearances do not strongly
affect EOT-based attacks. On the other hand, +light con-
verged much slower than other settings. Thus, we conclude
that if randomized lighting is needed to generalize the ro-
bustness of PATs during deployment, then more attack iter-
ations are needed to ensure convergence.
For pose-related variables in Figure 5b, halving the
poster size (small poster) caused the PAT attack to
fail. Changing the ranges of camera poses (+cam pose,
-cam pose) resulted in notable performance differences,
therefore we note that more iterations are needed to gen-
erate effective PATs under wider viewpoint ranges. Per-
haps surprisingly, for -target pose, locking the tar-
get’s pose to the center of the poster resulted in faster and
stronger convergence. This is likely because regions around
the static target obtained consistent perturbations across all
scenes, and so developed adversarial patterns faster.
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Figure 5: PAT attack strength for various EOT variables.
6.4. Imitation Attacks
As discussed in Section 4.3, we can add a perceptual
similarity loss term to make the PAT imitate a meaningful
source image. A larger perceptual similarity weight wps
perturbs the source less, but at the cost of slower conver-
gence and weaker or ineffective adversarial strength. Re-
sults below reflect a manually-tuned setting of wps = 0.6.
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Figure 6: Adversarial imitations under various losses.
Figure 6 shows that some source images, coupled with
the right adversarial loss, led to stronger imitations than oth-
ers. For instance, the waves source was optimized into a
potent PAT using Lnt & Lga+, yet using Lnt alone failed
to produce an adversarial texture. However, we found that
for a given threshold on L2 distance, guided losses gener-
ally converged faster to reach potent behaviors, yet suffered
from weakened adversarial strength compared to Lnt over
prolonged attack iterations (see Appendix F for quantitative
details). Also, under larger wps constraints, we saw that
adversarial perturbations appeared only in selective parts
of the texture. Notably, the “striped patches” seen in non-
imitated PATs (Figure 4) also emerged near the dogs’ face
and over the PR2 robot, when optimized using Lnt. We
thus conclude that the PAT attack produces critical adver-
sarial patterns such as these patches first, and then perturbs
other regions into supporting adversarial patterns.
Further substantiating this claim, Figure 7 visualizes pre-
dicted bounding-boxes within search areas located at differ-
ent sub-regions of PATs. We see from Figure 7a that pre-
dictions around the adversarial “striped patch” made GO-
TURN track towards it. This suggests that such critical
adversarial patterns induce potent lock-on behaviors that
break tracking, regardless of where the actual target is po-
sitioned. On the other hand, shown in Figure 7b, the “regu-
lar wavy” pattern optimized using Lga+ resulted in the in-
tended adversarial behavior of larger-sized predictions, re-
gardless of the search area’s location.
(a) Lg,sim tracker; Lnt loss (b) Lg,s+r tracker; Lga+ loss
Figure 7: Adversarial behaviors emerging from PATs.
6.5. Demonstration of Sim-to-real Transfer
To assess the real-world effectiveness of PATs generated
purely using simulated scenes, we displayed them on a 50′′
TV within an indoor environment with static lighting. We
carried out two sets of person-following experiments using
the camera on a Parrot Bebop 2 drone: tracking sessions
with a stationary drone, and servoing runs where the tracked
predictions were used to control the robot to follow the tar-
get through space (see Section 3 for details).
In both experiments, we tasked the s+r GOTURN in-
stance to follow people that were not seen in the tracker’s
training dataset. While we tested under different light in-
tensities, for each static setting, we first fit a linear per-
channel lighting model to a color calibration target, and then
adjusted camera frames accordingly, as explained in Sec-
tion 5.1. We carried out this optional step to showcase ad-
versarial performance in best-case conditions, and note that
none of the simulated evaluations corrected for per-scenario
lighting. Also, this correction compensates for fabrication
errors that may arise when displaying the PAT on a TV or
printed as a static poster, and further serves as an alternative
to adding a Non-Printability Score to the attack loss [20].
During our experiments, we observed 57/80 stationary
runs and 6/18 servoing runs to have strong lock-on adver-
sarial behaviors. For succinctness, we focus on qualitative
analyses below; please refer to Appendix H for more exten-
sive quantitative results and visual samples.
For stationary tracking runs, only adversaries containing
“striped patches” consistently made GOTURN break away
from the person. Other PATs optimized by, e.g., Lga+,
caused the tracker to make worse predictions as the target
moved in front of the poster, yet it ultimately locked back
onto the person. While these results were partially due to
our limited-size digital poster, a more general cause is likely
because such losses induced weak adversarial behaviors: by
encouraging growing predictions, GOTURN could still see
and thus track the person within an enlarged search area.
Returning to the best-performing PATs containing
“striped patches”, the tracker strongly preferred to lock
onto these rather than the person. Moreover, even though
the person could regain GOTURN’s focus by completely
blocking the patch, as soon as he or she moved away, the
tracker locked back onto the patch, as seen in Figure 8. Fur-
thermore, these physical adversaries were robust to various
viewing distances and angles, and even for settings outside
the ranges used to randomize scenes during the PAT attack.
Our servoing tests showed that it was generally harder
to make GOTURN completely break away from the tar-
get. Since the drone was moving to follow the target,
even though the tracker’s predictions were momentarily dis-
turbed or locked onto the PAT, often the robot’s momentum
caused GOTURN to return its focus onto the person. We at-
tribute the worsened PAT performance to motion blurring,
light gradients, and specular reflections that were present
due to the moving camera, all of which were assumed away
by our PAT attack. Nevertheless, we believe that these ad-
vanced scene characteristics can be marginalized by the
EOT algorithm, using a higher-fidelity rendering engine
than our implementation.
Figure 8: An imitated PAT, created in simulation, can fool a
person-tracker in the real world.
Finally, we speculate that synthetically-generated adver-
sarial patterns like the “striped patches” may look like simu-
lated people or robot targets in GOTURN’s view. If so, then
our real-world transfer experiments may have been aided by
GOTURN’s inability to tell apart synthetic targets from real
people. This caveat may be overcome by carrying out PAT
attack using scenes synthesized with textured 3-D recon-
structions or photograph appearances of the intended target.
7. Conclusion
We presented a system to generate Physical Adver-
sarial Textures (PAT) for fooling object trackers. These
“PATterns” induced diverse adversarial behaviors, emerg-
ing from a common optimization framework with the end-
goal of making the tracker break away from its intended
target. We compared different adversarial objectives and
showed that a new family of guided losses, when well-
engineered, resulted in stellar adversarial strength and con-
vergence speed. We also showed that a naive application of
EOT by randomizing all aspects of scenes was not neces-
sary. Finally, we showcased synthetically-generated PATs
that can fool real-world trackers.
We hope to raise awareness that inconspicuously-colored
items can mislead modern vision-based systems by merely
being present in their vicinity. Despite recent advances, we
argue that purely vision-based tracking systems are not ro-
bust to physical adversaries, and thus recommend commer-
cial tracking and servoing systems to integrate auxiliary sig-
nals (e.g., GPS and IMU) for redundancy and safety.
Since a vital goal of this work is to show the existence
of inconspicuous patterns that fool trackers, we made the
simplifying assumption of white-box access. More practi-
cally, it might be possible to augment the PAT attack us-
ing diverse techniques [17, 5, 23] to fool black-box victim
models. Another improvement could be to directly opti-
mize non-differentiable metrics such as µIOUd by, e.g.,
following the Houdini method [6]. Finally, although the tex-
tures shown in this work may appear inconspicuous prior to
our demonstrations, they are nevertheless clearly visible and
thus can be detected and protected against. As the research
community aims to defend against physical adversaries, we
should continue to be on the lookout for potent PATs that
more closely imitate natural items in the physical world.
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Appendix A. Simulated Scenarios
Figure 9 depicts samples of the 5 target (human or hu-
manoid robot models) and 4 scenarios (outdoor and indoor
scenes) that we created within the Gazebo simulation soft-
ware [13]. These are used both for generating and evaluat-
ing Physical Adversarial Textures (PAT).
(a) t-shirt person in
school
(b) white person in
playground
(c) green person in
school
(d) t-shirt person in
forest
(e) robonaut in forest (f) PR2 in cafe
Figure 9: Samples of simulated scenarios.
Appendix B. PAT Attack: Random Scene Con-
figuration
The Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) algo-
rithm [1] randomizes various parameters and aspects of
scenes, such as camera placement and target appearance.
By optimizing on these diverse and randomized scenes, we
can ensure that the generated PAT would likely be univer-
sally adversarial. Table 1 presents default ranges used for
continuous transformation variables used in our PAT Attack
process, while Table 2 enumerates selections for discrete
transformation variables. This default configuration is used
in Sections 6.2, 6.4, and 6.5.
Table 1: Continous EOT variable ranges for PAT attack.
Transformation Min Max
Initial camera x (m) -1.5 1.5
Initial camera y (m) -11.0 -6.0
Initial camera z (m) 0.6 1.8
Initial camera roll (◦) 0.0 0.0
Initial camera pitch (◦) -5.0 5.0
Initial camera yaw (◦) -15.0 15.0
Camera ∆x (m) -0.1 0.1
Camera ∆y (m) -0.5 0.5
Camera ∆z (m) -0.1 0.1
Camera ∆roll (◦) 0.0 0.0
Camera ∆pitch (◦) -3.0 3.0
Camera ∆yaw (◦) -3.0 3.0
Initial target x (m) -1.4 1.4
Initial target y (m) -5.0 -0.7
Initial target z (m) 0.0 0.0
Initial target roll (◦) 0.0 0.0
Initial target pitch (◦) 0.0 0.0
Initial target yaw (◦) 0.0 180.0
Target ∆x (m) -0.1 0.1
Target ∆y (m) -0.1 0.1
Target ∆z (m) 0.0 0.0
Target ∆roll (◦) 0.0 0.0
Target ∆pitch (◦) 0.0 0.0
Target ∆yaw (◦) -10.0 10.0
Lighting diffuse hue 0.0 360.0
Lighting diffuse saturation 0.0 0.2
Lighting diffuse value 0.1 0.7
Table 2: Discrete EOT variable selections for PAT attack.
Backgrounds Targets
school green person
forest PR2
Appendix C. Trained GOTURN models
Figure 10 illustrates the two GOTURN neural object
tracking architectures used in our experiments.
Appendix D. Baseline PAT Attack Settings
The parameters used in the baseline PAT attack settings
(see Section 6.1.3) were determined using hyperparameters
search, and from conducting sensitivity analyses on EOT
minibatch size and iteration, as well as texture attributes ex-
periments.
D.1. EOT Minibatch Size and Iteration
Similar to how training a neural network using Stochas-
tic Gradient Descent (SGD) is sensitive to hyperparameter
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(b) Reduced-capacity model (Sm)
Figure 10: Neural architectures for the GOTURN object tracker instances.
settings, we analyzed the sensitivity of our proposed PAT at-
tack method to its hyperparameters. We suspect that attacks
using smaller EOT minibatch sizes B would require more
iterations I to converge assuming a fixed perturbation step
size α, while attacks using large minibatch sizes B would
require an impractical amount of computing time per itera-
tion. Thus, it is practically beneficial to balance the combi-
nation of the perturbation step size α and the minibatch size
B, given a fixed number of attack iterations I .
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Figure 11: Adversarial strength over attack iterations, for
various α values and EOT minibatch size.
We first optimized α for a fixed minibatch size of B =
20. As shown in Figure 11a, a step size of α = 0.025
attained the best end-performance, however α = 0.075
converged initially much faster. This trade-off substanti-
ates our empirical observations and suggests that the source
texture initially needs to have most of its pixels broadly
perturbed to cause adversarial texture patterns to emerge,
which would require drastic pixel changes with large per-
turbation sizes. Subsequently, however, slight localized
pixel enhancements around “critical adversarial patterns”
(see Section 6.4) steadily enhance the PAT’s adversarial
strength. Thus, we recommend a practical schedule that
starts with a large perturbation size of α = 0.075 for 500
attack iterations, and then refines using a smaller step size
of α = 0.025.
Next, using a single non-scheduled perturbation size of
α = 0.075, we varied the EOT minibatch size B. Note
that, in Figure 11b, µIOUd is plotted against the number
of total EOT scenarios observed, i.e., B × I . These results
show consistent performance trends that are proportional to
B × I , i.e. the total number of scenes seen by each PAT
attack, rather than the number of attack iterations I itself.
Also, beyond small values of B ≥ 20 that lead to high-
variance stochastic gradient updates, larger minibatch sizes
result in similar and diminishing amounts of improvement
in both initial convergence speed and asymptotic adversarial
strength. Consequently, we choseB = 20 for the best trade-
off between compute per attack iteration and convergence.
D.2. Texture Attributes
Various related work made different recommendations
on which source texture to use for best results. In particu-
lar, suggestions included all-white and all-yellow [27], and
a random contrasted checkerboard pattern alternating be-
tween uniform sampling of [0, 255] and {0, 255} [26]. We
also tried an all-gray source pattern, as well as a per-pixel
randomly-sampled source.
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Figure 12: Adversarial strength among various initial tex-
tures and texture sizes.
However, as shown in Figure 12a, we found that initial-
izing the texture with different patterns did not result in sig-
nificant changes in convergence nor performance.
We also explored the effects of changing texture sizes
and found that using a resolution of 32× 32 lead to consis-
tently poor results, while settings of 64×64, 128×128, and
256 × 256, yielded little differences in both initial conver-
gence speed and asymptotic performance, as seen in Fig-
ure 12b. We thus chose 128 × 128 to balance between
having sufficient pixel capacity to accommodate the wide
ranges of EOT conditions, and amount of computation to
compute texture perturbations. Still, we found it very im-
portant to be aware that our resolution choices are signifi-
cantly affected by the viewing distances (see Appendix B)
and poster sizes used in our experiments.
Appendix E. Ablation of EOT Conditioning
Variables
In Section 6.3 of the main paper, we evaluated the
effects of varying the ranges or choices for different
EOT transformation variables, including background (-bg,
+bg), target (-target, +target), lighting (-light,
+light), poster size (small poster), camera pose
(-cam pose, +cam pose), and target pose (-target
pose, +target pose). Modified ranges to camera pose,
target pose, and lighting are shown in Table 3, 4, and 5, re-
spectively. Also, variations for (-bg, +bg) and (-target,
+target) are as follows:
• -bg: use playground only;
• +bg: randomize among school, forest,
playground and cafe;
• -target: use green person only;
• +target: randomize among green person,
white person, t-shirt person, PR2 and
robonaut.
Table 3: PAT attack settings for -cam pose and +cam
pose.
Transformation -cam pose +cam poseMin Max Min Max
Initial x (m) 0.0 0.0 -2.0 2.0
Initial y (m) -8.5 -8.5 -16.5 -5.5
Initial z (m) 1.2 1.2 0.4 2.2
Initial roll (◦) 0.0 0.0 -1.5 1.5
Initial pitch (◦) 0.0 0.0 -10.0 10.0
Initial yaw (◦) 0.0 0.0 -20.0 20.0
∆x (m) 0.0 0.0 -0.15 0.15
∆y (m) 0.0 0.0 -0.80 0.80
∆z (m) 0.0 0.0 -0.15 0.15
∆roll (◦) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆pitch (◦) 0.0 0.0 -5.0 5.0
∆yaw (◦) 0.0 0.0 -5.0 5.0
Table 4: PAT attack settings for -target pose and
+target pose.
Transformation -target pose +target poseMin Max Min Max
Initial x (m) 0.0 0.0 -1.6 1.6
Initial y (m) -2.7 -2.7 -5.0 -0.7
Initial z (m) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Initial roll (◦) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Initial pitch (◦) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Initial yaw (◦) 90.0 90.0 -90.0 270.0
∆x (m) 0.0 0.0 -0.15 0.15
∆y (m) 0.0 0.0 -0.15 0.15
∆z (m) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆roll (◦) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆pitch (◦) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆yaw (◦) 0.0 0.0 -20.0 20.0
Appendix F. Imitation Attacks
In Section 6.4, we set the value of wps = 0.6. This value
was determined based on an experiment where we stud-
Table 5: PAT attack settings for -light and +light.
Diffuse Light Source -light +lightMin Max Min Max
Hue 0.0 360.0 0.0 360.0
Saturation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Value 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7
ied the effect of changing wps on the adversarial strength
µIOUd and perceptual similarity (as measured by the
Euclidean L2 distance to the source image in RGB col-
orspace). Unsurprisingly, as seen in Figure 13, smaller val-
ues of wps imposed fewer constraints and thus lead to faster
attack convergence and better end-performance, while the
inverse was true for larger values of wps. We thus chose
wps = 0.6 after manually assessing which PATs had rec-
ognizable levels of perceptual similarity to their source im-
ages, as seen in Figure 18.
To substantiate Figure 6, Figure 14 illustrates how
µIOUd and perceptual similarity metrics change over at-
tack iterations. As we can see, some specific combinations
of initial posters and losses made the attack easier to con-
verge. For example, performing attacks using waves as
initial texture with hybrid losses (Lnt & Lga+) resulted in
strong adversaries, while using non-targeted loss alone did
not.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
attack iteration
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
uI
OU
d w_ps=0.1
w_ps=0.2
w_ps=0.4
w_ps=0.6
w_ps=0.8
w_ps=1.0
(a) uIOUd
0 200 400 600 800 1000
attack iteration
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
L2
 n
or
m
w_ps=0.1
w_ps=0.2
w_ps=0.4
w_ps=0.6
w_ps=0.8
w_ps=1.0
(b) L2-norm perceptual similarity
Figure 13: Adversarial strength and perceptual similarity
among various wps.
Figure 15 compares perceptual similarity (L2 norm)
against adversarial strength (µIOUd) among Lga−, Lnt,
and Lt−, and shows that, for a given threshold on L2 norm,
Lga− generally had better early convergence, but likely
weakened adversarial strength after more attack iterations.
Figure 19 illustrates the emergence of “critical adversar-
ial patterns” that we discussed in Section 6.4 in the main pa-
per. In Figure 19a, the critical dark striped pattern started to
emerge at around iteration 400, followed by the appearances
of other nearby colorful patterns, which presumably were
to drive predictions towards the central adversarial striped
pattern. In contrast, when we imposed a perceptual simi-
larity loss during an imitation attack, only the dark striped
pattern eventually emerged after significantly more attack
iterations, as seen in Figure 19b.
Appendix G. Transfer among tracking models
We evaluated the transferability of PATs among different
tracking models. When evaluating PATs on GOTURN mod-
els trained using different datasets, the off-diagonal results
in Figure 16a generally show that a decent-to-great amount
of adversarial strength is still present. Nevertheless, we see
that the transferred efficacy of adversaries varied based on
the tracker model and the loss used. For instance, a sim-
trained PAT optimized using Lnt and applied to the s2r
GOTURN tracker is strongly adversarial, whereas a similar
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Figure 14: Adversarial strength and perceptual similarity
among source textures shown in Figure 6 of main paper.
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Figure 15: Performance of Lnt, Lga−, and Lt− in imitating dogs and PR2 textures for wps ∈ [0.1 : 0.1 : 0.8].
PAT optimized using Lga+ becomes completely inert.
Similarly, PATs preserved some of their adversarial
strength when transferred between trackers with different
capacities, as seen in Figure 16b. However, while all
PATs applied to reduced-capacity models (Sm) affected GO-
TURN predictions, their µIOUd values around 0.20 do not
reflect strong adversaries, thus indicating that it is more dif-
ficult to fool small-capacity GOTURN networks into con-
sistently breaking away from their intended target.
Figure 17 shows the PATs used in this experiment. Gen-
erally, we observe similar adversarial patterns emerging
from PAT Attacks on GOTURN models trained on different
datasets, as well as different capacities, which explain why
PATs transfer to a certain degree among different GOTURN
trackers. The sole exception is seen from the second row
of Figure 17a, which reflected the fact that the adversarial
loss Lga+ caused different patterns to emerge for different
models, albeit with similar levels of competent adversarial
strength.
Appendix H. Demonstration of Sim-to-real
Transfer
As discussed in Section 6.5, we conducted test runs in
real-world tracking and servoing conditions, and qualita-
tively verified the transferred adversarial strength of our
synthetically-generated PATs, especially those containing
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Figure 16: Adversarial strength of generated PATs
(columns) applied to different GOTURN tracking models
(rows).
“critical adversarial patterns”. Many of these real-world
runs are shown in the supplementary video. Neverthe-
less, it is generally difficult to quantify performance con-
sistently in the real world, due to tediousness and impracti-
cality in labeling performance, controlling for repeated con-
ditions, and dealing with practical complexities such as lim-
ited battery life and hardware failures. Still, we segmented
runs into video clips, and manually labeled them as either
strongly adversarial (i.e. where the tracker jumps onto
the PAT and stays locked onto it even when momentarily ob-
structed), weakly adversarial (i.e. where the tracker some-
times switches from the person to the PAT, and tends to latch
back onto the person), or failure.
Looking at Table 6, we see that the tracker was quickly
drawn to PATs when deployed on a stationary camera. On
the other hand, it was much harder to fool the person tracker
when the drone was servoing the target. Whether the PAT
was displayed digitally on a monitor, or printed as an A0
poster, we anecdotally observed that both of these materi-
als displayed some amount of specular reflections. These
specularities changed as the camera moved around, and thus
likely had altered the appearances of PATs during our ser-
voing runs and rendered them inert. Therefore, devising
adversaries that are robust to specularities would be an ex-
citing avenue for future research.
Table 6: Physical-world attack performance.
Runs Strong Weak Fail
Stationary 57 (71%) 13 (16%) 10 (13%)
Servo 6 (33%) 5 (28%) 7 (39%)
(a) Different training datasets for GOTURN models
(b) Different network capacities for GOTURN models
Figure 17: PATs used in the transferability among tracking models experiment.
Figure 18: PATs generated with various wps values.
(a) Non-imitation attack
(b) Imitation attack
Figure 19: The emergence of “critical adversarial patterns” for non-imitation and imitation attacks.
Figure 20: PAT fools the tracker in simulation. Here, the purple bounding box represents the ground truth bounding box of
the tracked object, while the green bounding box represents the tracker’s prediction. Note that the sequence starts from the
top-left frame to the bottom-right frame.
Figure 21: PAT fools the tracker in the real world indoor setting, where the PAT is displayed on a TV. Note that the sequence
starts from the top-left frame to the bottom-right frame.
Figure 22: PAT fools the tracker in the real world indoor setting during servoing run. Note that the sequence starts from the
top-left frame to the bottom-right frame.
Figure 23: PAT fools the tracker in the real world outdoor setting during servoing run, where the PAT is printed as a poster.
Note that the sequence starts from the top-left frame to the bottom-right frame.
